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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Respondent has misstated the issues presented for 
review and misstated the facts of this case. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Appellant asserts that the brief of Respondent 
misstates and misrepresents that which is brought before this 
Court/ the record and the facts of this case. Therefore/ by way 
of this Reply Brief/ Appellant shall clarify that which has been 
clouded/ by issue. 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case 
is presented in the Appendix of Appellant's Petition. 
JURISDICTION 
Respondent has stipulated to the jurisdiction presented 
by Appellant in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The controlling statutory and other provisions are set 
forth in Appellant's Petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case has been correctly stated in Appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tne facts of this case have been correctly set forth in 
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
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POINT I - CUSTODY 
P£RT A. STIPULATIONS 
Respondent and the Utah Court of Appeals claim that the 
proposed stipulations should be used to determine if custody is 
at issue. Ebbert v. Ebbert/ Case No. 860299-CA (Utah App. 1987). 
This is improper and cannot stand. The role/ scope and weight of 
stipulations are clearly defined in Brown v. Brown/ 744 P.2d 333 
(Utah App. 1987). See Appendix. 
A review of this case will show that these two opinions 
create a direct conflict between two panels of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
Further/ the Utah Court of Appeals and Respondent 
ignore that which is in the proposed stipulations which 
demonstrates that custody was in fact at issue and tried. A 
review of these shows absolutely that Appellant retained "all 
parental entitlements" in the last four drafts of the proposed 
stipulations. The final decree does not award Appellant "all 
parental entitlements/" but instead/ severely limits his parental 
rights. 
Therefore/ the Utah Court of Appeals has decided this 
case in conflict with Utah law. If not/ there would be a record 
of the parties' agreement to the limitation of Appellant's rights 
or a court order doing same. Whereas/ the parties never agreed 
to this limitation and the trial court limited Appellant's 
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rights/ custody was tried. 
Where parental rights are limited by a trial court/ as 
in this case/ two things are required in law. First and 
foremost/ there must be a hearing on parental fitness. Second/ 
there must be proper findings of fact which identify why there is 
a limitation. 
The trial court failed to do either/ and the Utah Court 
of Appeals has upheld these errors of law. 
PART B. PLEADINGS 
Appellant has attached within the Appendix of this 
Reply Brief copies of the pleadings in totality. A review of 
these will demonstrate beyond question that the pleadings place 
custody at issue twice. First/ by Respondent's Counterclaim/ 
which denied the offer of custody which was made subject to 
liberal visitation. Second/ when Appellant filed a timely Answer 
to Respondent's Counterclaim/ wherein Appellant denied Respondent 
should have custody. See Appendix. 
Both the Utah Court of Appeals and Respondent have 
misstated and misrepresented the pleadings by ignoring both of 
the above-mentioned points wherein custody was placed at issue by 
the pleading of both parties. 
POINT II - ASSETS 
Respondent's brief again misstates and misrepresents to 
this Court that which is brought before it in the petition of the 
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Appellant. A fast review of Appellant's brief/ Petition/ at 
pages 16/ 17 and 18 shows without question that Utah law is in 
conflict with the decision in this case and further that the 
Utah Court of Appeals has failed to answer that which was brought 
before it for resolution. 
POINT III - BIAS 
Respondent argues that the Utah Court of Appeals was 
correct in its determination that it could not review the issue 
of bias because same was not testified to. First/ this is a 
misstatement of fact. Appellant testified to bias and the harm 
thereof. (R. at 579-580) 
Not only did Appellant preserve this issue by way of 
testimony/ this decision of the Utah Court of Appeals is in 
direct conflict with the decision of another panel of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. See, Marchant v. Marchant/ Case No. 860250-CA 
(Utah App. 1987)/ which was filed less than 60 days before the 
filing of the case at bar/ sets a totally different standard for 
review of bias and did not require an objection at trial. 
POINT IV - CHILD SUPPORT 
Respondent falsely and incorrectly claims that 
Appellant argues the wealth of parents should be placed upon 
Respondent. This is not what Appellant has ever questioned. 
Appellant submits the errors in law of the Utah Court of Appeals 
as follows: 
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1) The Utah Court of Appeals answered a question which 
was not brought before it for review. 
2) The Utah Court of Appeals decided/ in conflict with 
Utah law/ that the discretionary income of Respondent should not 
be considered, while all income of the Appellant should be 
considered. 
3) The Utah Court of Appeals decided in conflict with 
another panel of the Utah Court of Appeals that Utah Code 
Annotated 78-45-7(1)(2) need not be followed by upholding the 
equalization of income methodology employed by the trial court, 
which included the use of false figures without any consideration 
to the required factors set forth in the above-mentioned State 
Code. 
These conflicts in law are brought forth by Judge 
Bench's statements from the bench during oral arguments, Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 and Stroud v. Stroud, Case No. 860049-CA 
(Utah App. 1987). 
Should these errors be allowed to stand, parents will 
be denied their right to support their children to the best of 
their ability. The State may well receive the burden of 
supporting children when, in fact, the parents have ample funds 
to care for their children and themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant prays that the Utah Supreme Court will now 
5 
exercise its judicial discretion by granting a review of the 
opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals and order a new trial to 
correct these errors or decide this case in a manner which is 
consistent with the laws of Utah. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this Z^7^ day of February, 
1988. 
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
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HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four (4) copies 
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, on this / £ - ^ day 
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William H. Christensen, Esq. 
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APPENDIX A 
COMPLAINT 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
ANSWER 
Kenn M. Hanson (1355) 
HASKINS & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 268-3994 
^ ^ ^ ^ v ^ ^ ^ ^ " 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA ANN EBBERT 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
7:85 21 
Comes now the above-named Plaintiff and for cause of action 
alleges and complains against the Defendant as follows: 
Provi sions Relating to Jurisdiction 
1. That Plaintiff is a bona fide and actual resident of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah and has been for more than three 
months immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife 
having been married at Salt Lake County, State of Utah on June 
19, 1976. 
Provisions Relating the Chi Id Custody and Support 
3. That the parties have two (2) minor children born as 
issue of this marriage, namely; ANNE EBBERT, born February 14, 
1980 and AMY EBBERT, born June 16, 1982. 
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4. Defendant should be awarded the care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor children subject to the Defendant's 
right to liberal visitation at minimum as follows: 
a. Every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until 
Sunday at 6:00 p.m.; 
b. One night during the week from 6:00 p.m. until 9:00 
p.m.; 
c. Every other red-letter holiday (e.g. July 4th, 
Labor Day, etc.,) from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m.; 
d. All day on alternate Thanksgiving Day; 
e. With Defendant on Christmas Eve and until noon en 
Christmas day and with Plaintiff' from noon on Christmas 
Day and for the four (4) following days; 
f. Half day on each child's birthday. 
g. All day with Defendant on Mother's Day and with 
Plaintiff on Father's Day. 
h. For one week for each month of the minor children's 
summer vacation for a minimum of three (3) weeks. 
i. Any other visitation as mutually-agreed upon by 
both parties hereto. 
5. Plaintiff should be allowed to retain all parental 
entitlements with the parties' minor children as if the parties 
were not divorced, such as thw right to attend parent/teacher 
conference, and to receive notice of illness or injury to child. 
6. It is reasonable that Plaintiff should pay to the 
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Defendant a reasonable sum for the support and maintenance of the 
parties1 two minor children. 
Provisions Relating to Grounds 
7. That the Defendant has treated the Plaintiff cruelly 
causing Plaintiff great mental distress and thereby making it 
impossible to continue the marriage. 
Provis ions Relating to Alimony 
8. Neither party should be awarded alimony. 
Provisions Relating the Real Property 
9. That during the course of the marriage the parties have 
acquired real property which should be awarded as follows: 
a. The real property at 723,8 South 1710 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah should be awarded to Plaintiff subject tc no 
lien by Defendant; 
b. The real property at 7389 South 1710 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah should be awarded to Defendant subject tc 
her assumption of any mortgages or liens thereon. Plaintiff 
should execute a quit claim deed releasing his interest in 
said property to the Defendant subject to a lien in favor of 
Plaintiff in the sum of $25,000.00. Said lien should be 
paid to Plaintiff at the time of the first of any of the 
following occurences: Defendant remarries or cohabitates 
with a member of the opposite sex who is not a relative; the 
residence is sold or is no longer the primary residence of 
the Defendant; there are no minor children of the parties 
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residing with Defendant at said residence. 
Prov1sions Relating to Personal Property 
10. During the course of the marriage the parties have 
acquired personal property which should be awarded as outlined in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
Provisions Relating to Debts and Obiigations 
11. It is reasonable that the indebtedness of the parties 
should be assumed and paid as follows: 
a. Plaintiff should assume and pay, holding the 
Defendant harmless from, the mortgage on the residence at 
7238 South 1710 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the 
indebtedness to Arthur Frank's. 
b. Defendant should assume and pay, holding the 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom, any mortgages and liens on the 
residence at 7389 South 1710 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
the debts owing ZCMI, Weinstocks, Nordstroms, Sears, VISA, 
American Express, and the continental Ban^onsol idation lean. 
Provi sions Relating to Hea 1th, Dental and Life Insurance 
12. It is reasonable that the Plaintiff should maintain 
a health insurance policy on the parties' minor children when 
such is made available to him through his place of employment. 
Each party should be ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of all 
medical, dental, orthodontic, and optical expenses incurred en 
behalf of the minor children when such expenses are not covered 
by insurance, plaintiff should be required to maintain a life 
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insurance policy on himself with the parties1 minor children 
named as sole irrevocable beneficiaries in the minimum sum of 
$25,000.00 each. 
Provisions Relating to Income Taxes and Exemptions 
13. It is reasonable that the Plaintiff should be entitled 
to claim the parties' minor children as dependants for income tax 
purposes. 
Provis ions Relating to Attorney's Fees 
14. It is reasonable that the Plaintiff should pay his own 
attorney's fees incurred in this matter as long as the matter 
remains uncontested. In the event the matter becomes contested 
the Defendant should be ordered to pa,y all attorney's fees and 
court costs as deemed equitable by the Court. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a Decree of Divorce and an 
award of property as set forth in the Complaint. 
DATED this / f day of - U vi'g", / _7 / 1 9 8 5 , / 
KENN M. HANSON / 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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E x h i b i t "A" 
Eddie Clarence Ebbert vs. Barbara E. Ebbert 
Proposed distribution of parties personal property. 
Plaintiff, Eddie Clarence Ebbert, should be awarded the following 
items of personal property: 
Sony portable television 
Magnavox 19" television 
Minolta camera 
Cannon camera 
Movie camera and projector 
Chaise Lounge and chair of lawn furniture 
Gas barbecue 
Office furniture and fixtures 
Gold couch 
Two (2) gold chairs 
Small china hutch 
One (1 ) end table 
One (1 ) coffee table 
Clear crystal 
Kirby vacuum cleaner 
Dining room furniture 
Two (2) lamps 
Stocks/savings plan 
C.D.s 
Defendant, Barbara Ann Ebbert, should be awarded the following 
items of personal property: 
Sony 12" television 
G.E. 19" television 
Quasar VCR 
Bedroom furniture 
1982 Buick Skylark 
Disc camera 
Kodamatic 
Lawn furniture other than that specifically awarded to Plaintiff 
Barbeque 
Sewing machine 
Three (3) couches 
Three (3) chairs 
Large china hutch 
Small cabinet 
Two (2) end tables 
One (1 ) coffee table 
Television stand 
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ftefrigerator 
Washer and dryer 
Microwave oven 
Towels and 1inens 
Lawnmower 
Smoked crystal 
Stoneware 
Crystal punch set 
Noritake china 
Gorham Hispana silverware 
Silver including ice bucket, tea set, nut dishes and heating dish 
Art 
Hoover and small vacuum cleaners 
Toaster 
Can opener 
Cuisinart 
Waffle iron 
Ice and Easy 
Coffee maker 
Two (2) irons 
Mixer 
Hand mixer 
Dining room set 
Two (2) lamps 
2 
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PROPERTY VALUE ED BABBABA 
Sony P o r t . T.V. 150 150 
Sony 12" ., 350 350 
Mag*>»t*X r V ft 400 400 
G.E. 19 " TV 500 500 
Quasar VCR 550 550 
Bedrooms 1.000 1,000 
600 600 
100 100 
Car 82 Buick 3,000 3,000 
Cmeras Disc 45 j*5 
Kodamatic 45 ^ 
Minolta 90 90 
Cannon 250 250 
Projector 300 300 
Movie 250 250 
Lawn Furn. 680 195 485, 
Bar B Q 150 150 
75 75 
Sewing Machine 300 300 
Office: 2,000 2,000 
Couches 200 200 
200 200 
300 300 
500 500 
Chairs ?5 75 
75 75 
75 75 
200 200 
China Hutches 
200 200 
,400 1,^00 
300 300 
Small cabnet 500 500 
End tables 5° 50 
50 50 
50 50 
Coffee Tables 50 50 
50 50 
T.V. Stand 300 300 
VALUE 
Refirig. 
Washer & Dryer 
Micro Wave 
Lawn Mower 
Towels and Linens 
Clear Crystal 
Smoked Crystal 
Stoneware 
Crystal punch set 
China Noritake 12 sets 
with servings. 
Savanah 
Arvana 
Silver ware 
Gorham Hispana 
Silver 2 cake, 
Tea Set, 
Heating i 
Art 
Vacume cleaners 
Toaster 
Can opener 
Cuisinart 
Waffle Iron 
Ice & Easy 
Coffee 
2 Irons 
Mixer 
Hand mixer 
Ice bucket, 
400 
1,000 
1,200 
300 
400 
7 
7 
150 
300 
800 
1,000 
1,600 
2 nut dishes, 
dish: 
Kirby 
Hoover 
Small 
600 
1,200 
100 
200 
100 
50 
35 
80 
40 
40 
60 
?o 
200 
35 
Dining Rooms 5,000 
150 
Lamps 
Stocks 
C.D.'s 
Small House 
Large House 
Totals 
VALUK 
85 
85 
85 
85 
5,000 
4,600 
25,000 
65,000 
130,460 
ED 
85 
85 
5,000 
4,600 
25,000 
25,6?5 
65,230 
BARBARA 
85 
85 
39,325 
65,230 
I will want the right to keep my dog at the large house for at 
least one year. 
I will also want to be able to use of the large house for 
storage for one year. 
JAMES P. COWLEY 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BARBARA ANN EBBERT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT, 
Plaintiff, : ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
vs. : Civil No. D85-2144 
BARBARA ANN EBBERT, : Judge: Phillip Fishier 
Defendant. : 
ANSWER 
The Defendant by way of Answer to the Plaintiff's 
Complaint, admits, denies and alleges as follows: Paragraphs 
1, 2, 3, and 6 of the Plaintiff's Complaint are admitted. 
2. Paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 
14 of the Plaintiff's Complaint are denied. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
By way of Counterclaim against the Plaintiff, the 
Defendant alleges as follows: 
JUL?2 4 o&VH'te 
»! J * 'LL'Vs 
J . . ' . . < 
"Hhti^ 
1. The Defendant is an actual and bona fide resi-
dent of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and has been for 
more than three months prior to the filing of Complaint by 
Plaintiff. 
2. The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married 
to each other in Salt Lake City, Utah on June 19, 1976. 
3. Two children have been born issue of the mar-
riage. Both of these children are dependant and their names 
and birth dates are as follow: 
Anne Ebbert February 14, 1980 
Amy Ebbert June 16, 1982 
4. The Plaintiff is gainfully employed and has 
substantial income therefrom. The Defendant is gainfully 
employed, but the income from her employment is modest. 
5. The parties have during the marriage accumu-
lated substantial assets and have incurred some liabilities. 
6. The Plaintiff has treated the Defendant cruelly 
causing her great mental anguish, pain and suffering. 
WHEREFORE, The Defendant prays for a judgment as 
follows: 
1. Upon the Plaintiff's Complaint, for a judgment 
in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, no 
cause of action. 
2. Upon the Defendant's Counterclaim for a Judgment 
as follows: 
-2-
a. Granting to her a Judgment and Decree di-
vorcing her from the Plaintiff. 
b. Awarding to her the care, custody, and 
control of the minor children who are issue of the marriage, 
reserving to the Plaintiff the right to visit with said 
children at all reasonable times and places. 
c. For an Order requiring the Plaintiff to 
pay to the Defendant a reasonable sum for the support 
of the minor children who are the issue of the marriage 
and for such other matters relating to support of said 
children as the Court may deem appropriate and advisable 
in the premises. 
d. For an equitable division between the parties 
of the assets accumulated during the marriage. 
e. For an Order of the Court requiring the 
Plaintiff to pay to the Defendant a reasonable sum as 
alimony for the support of the Defendant and for such 
other matters with respect to the support of the Defendant 
as the Court deems advisable in the premises. 
f. For an Order and Judgment requiring the 
Plaintiff to pay to the Defendant a reasonable sum as 
attorney's fees for the use and benefit of the Defendant's 
attorneys in this matter together with all costs incurred 
herein. 
-3-
+. 
[I g. For such other relief as the Court deems just, equitable and appropriate under the circumstances 
DATED this ^ X~ day of L _Sk 1985 
AHES P. COWLEY 
/of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
0 South Main Street 
12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Barbara Ann Ebbert 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Answer and Counterclaim 
this ^ day of p<L^->^ , 1985, postage prepaid, 
Kenn M. Hanson, Esq. 
HASKINS & HANSON 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
-4-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Kenn M. Hanson, #1355 
HASKINS & HANSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 268-3994 
EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA ANN EBBERT 
Defendant. 
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. D85-2144 
Judge Phillip Fishier 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff above-named, by and through his coun-
sel, Kenn M. Hanson, and answers Defendants Counterclaim admitting 
and denying as follows: 
1. Plaintiff admits the allegations of paragraphs one (1), 
two (2) and three (3). 
2. Plaintiff admits that Plaintiff is gainfully employed and 
that Defendant is gainfully employed, but denies the remainder of 
the allegations of paragraph four (4). 
3. Plaintiff admits the allegations of paragraph five (5). 
4. Plaintiff denies the allegations of paragraph six (6). 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that Defendant's Counterclaim be 
dismissed and she take nothing thereby. 
25 
DATED this ^"7 day of lOr* <.-7C^ / 
. 1985 
KENN M. HANSON / 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct of the fore-
going Answer to Counterclaim to James P. Cowley, Attorney for the 
Defendant, 310 South Main Street, 12th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101, this 27th day of August, 1985. 
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APPENDIX B 
PAGES OF THE LAST FOUR PROPOSED STIPULATIONS 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing, the Court 
now makes and enters its 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. Each party is given and granted a Judgment and decree 
divorcing that party from the other. The same shall become final 
immediately upon the entry hereof. 
2. The care, custody and control of the two minor children 
who are issue of the marriage is granted to Defendant, subject to 
Plaintiff being awarded visitation rights with the said minor 
children which include the right to visit the children and 
have the children visit him at any and all reasonable times and 
places. The Plaintiff is accorded all parental entitlements with 
respect to the minor children including but not limited to 
attending parent/teacher conference, doctor appointments, and to 
receive immediate notice of illness or injury with regard to the 
children. The Defendant shall give the Plaintiff written notice 
not less than thirty (30) days in advance of her intention to 
move or relocate from her present address or her intention to 
move or relocate the parties* minor children. 
3. The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant as child 
support for the use and benefit of the two (2) minor children of 
the parties the sum of $250.00 per month for each of said minor 
children, commencing with payment in December, 1985 and 
continuing each month thereafter until each child attains the age 
2 
enters Its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant and Plaintiff are both actual and bona fide 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and were for more 
than three (3) months immediately prior to the commencement of 
this act ion, 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each other in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on June 19, 1976, and have since 
been husband and wife, 
3. Each party has treated the other cruelly, causing the 
other to suffer great mental pain, anguish and duress. 
4. Two children have been born as issue of the marriage: 
Anne Ebbert, born February 14, 1980, and Amy Ebbert, born June 
16, 1982. Both Plaintiff and Defendant are fit and proper to 
have the care, custody and control of the parties1 two (21 minor 
children and custody of the said minor children should be awarded 
to Defendant, subject to Plaintiff being awarded visitation with 
said minor children at any and all reasonable times and places 
and Plaintiff being awarded all parental rights with respect to 
the minor children including but not Umited to attending 
parent/teacher conference, doctor appointments, and to receive 
immediate notice of illness or injury with regard to the 
children. The Defendant should give the Plaintiff written notice 
not less than thirty (30) days in advance of her intention to 
move or relocate from her present address or her intention to 
S 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. Defendant and Plaintiff are both actual and bona fide 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and were for more 
than three (3) months immediately prior to the commencement of 
this act ion. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each other in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah on June 19, 1976 and have since 
been husband and wife. 
3. Each party has treated the other cruelly, causing the 
other to suffer great mental pain, anguish and duress. 
4. Two (2) children have been born as issue of the 
marriage: Anne Ebbert, born February 14, 1980, and Amy Ebbert, 
born June 16, 1982. Both Plaintiff and Defendant are fit and 
property to have the care, custody and control of the parties1 
two (2) minor children and custody of said children should be 
awarded to the Defendant, subject to the the Plaintiff being 
awarded visitation rights with the said minor children which 
include the right to visit the children and have the children 
visit him at any and all reasonable times and places. The 
Plaintiff should be accorded all parental entitlements with 
respect to the minor children including but not limited to 
attending parent/teacher conference, doctor appointments, and to 
receive immediate notice of illness or injury with regard to the 
children. The Defendant should give the Plaintiff written notice 
not less than thirty (30) days in advance of her intention to 
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Based upon the pleadings on file herein, and 
stipulation of the parties, the exhibits received and 
the testimony of the parties, and the Court having 
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and good cause appearing, the Court now makes 
and enters its 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. Each party is given and granted a Judgment 
and Decree divorcing that party from the other. The 
same shall become final immediately upon the entry 
hereof. 
2. The care, custody and control of the two minor 
children who are issue of the marriage is granted to 
Defendant, subject to the Plaintiff being awarded visita-
tion rights with the said minor children which include 
the right to visit the children and have the children 
visit him at any and all reasonable times and places. 
The Plaintiff is accorded all parental entitlements 
with respect to the minor children including but not 
limited to attending parent/teacher conference, doctor 
appointments, and to receive immediate notice of illness 
or injury with regard to the children. The Defendant 
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Plaintiff appeals from an order relative to the 
modification of a decree of divorce which treated a putative 
stipulation as dispositive of all issues. We reverse and remand. 
The parties were married on June 4, 1969. Three children 
were born to the Browns; all of whom are still minors at the 
time of this appeal. Defendant is a physician with a practice 
located in Salt Lake City. Plaintiff possesses a bachelor's 
degree and was not employed at the time of divorce. The amended 
decree of divorce was signed on February 21, 1980. The salient 
provisions were: plaintiff would have custody of the children 
subject to specified visitation rights; defendant would pay 
child support in the amount of $300.00 per child per month for a 
total of $900.00 per month; defendant would pay $900.00 per 
month as alimony which would cease if plaintiff remarried or 
cohabited with a male; and plaintiff would not be able to seek 
an increase in support or alimony for 36 months after the date 
of the decree. 
On March 1, 1983, plaintiff filed a petition for 
modification of the decree of divorce which was based on a 
significant increase in defendants gross income and a material 
change in plaintiff's circumstances. The two most important 
requests for modification were for increases in alimony and 
child support to $1,500.00 per month and $500.00 per child per 
month, respectively. Defendant counterpetitioned for 
termination of alimony and for expanded visitation rights. 
During the next fifteen months discovery and settlement 
negotiations took place* Plaintifffs deposition was scheduled 
for June 5, 1984, in preparation for a trial set for August 14, 
1984. Apparently plaintiff's counsel caused opposing counsel to 
believe that the issues had been resolved satisfactorily and that 
the time scheduled for the taking of plaintiff's deposition could 
be used to record the agreement. The parties and their 
respective counsel met on the scheduled date and recorded the 
agreement at issue before a certified shorthand reporter. In 
addition to visitation arrangements/ the agreement provided that/ 
commencing July 1984, alimony would be reduced from $900.00 per 
month to $500.00 per month and would continue for two years at 
the lower level before terminating. Child support was increased 
from $300.00 per child per month to $500.00 per child per month 
with conditions specified when such support would also 
terminate. The record indicates that both counsel and defendant 
spoke but that plaintiff said nothing during the proceedings. 
The agreement was subsequently reduced to writing and sent to 
plaintiff's counsel. Beginning in July 1984, defendant began 
paying the total amount set forth in the agreement/ which 
payments were accepted by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff contends that she was not given a copy of the 
written agreement until August 1984. She immediately attempted 
to consult with her counsel but was unable to see him until late 
in September. At that meeting, plaintiff stated that she 
believed the agreement to be unfair and refused to sign it. Her 
counsel withdrew on November 7, 1984. 
On February 14, 1985# defendant filed a motion for an order 
approving and enforcing the settlement agreement. On February 
25/ 1985/ plaintiff filed an affidavit which stated that her 
former counsel had assured her that increases in alimony and 
child support were justified and that he was confident she would 
win major increases in both; that she was unaware of the tenor oi 
the proposed settlement agreement until the day scheduled for he 
deposition; that her former counsel informed her that he told 
opposing counsel that she would agree to the settlement; that sh 
was "shocked/ dismayed/ dissapointed [sic], and confused" by her 
counsel's change in position; that she didn't recall speaking at 
the proceeding; and that she refused to sign the written 
agreement. A hearing on defendant's motion was held before the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner in March 1985/ who recommended 
that the motion be granted. Plaintiff rejected the 
recommendation and the motion was argued in Third District Court 
in April. The order enforcing the agreement was filed on May 1, 
1985/ and plaintiff timely filed her notice of appeal. The issi 
is whether or not the trial court should have accepted and 
enforced the proceedings of June 5, 1984/ as a stipulation 
between the parties. 
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It is necessary to begin by looking at what constitutes a 
"stipulation11. 
A promise or agreement with reference to a 
pending judicial proceeding, made by a party 
to the proceeding or his attorney, is 
binding without consideration. By statute 
or rule of court such an agreement is 
generally binding only (a) if it is in 
writing and signed by the party or attorney, 
or (b) if it is made or admitted in the 
presence of the court, or (c) to the extent 
that justice requires enforcement in view of 
material change of position in reliance on 
the promise or agreement. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 94 (1981). 
Further, 
It has been said that unless it is clear 
from the record that^the parties assented, 
there is no stipulation, and it is provided 
in many jurisdictions, by rule of court or 
by statute, that a private agreement or 
consent between the parties or their 
attorneys, in respect to the proceedings in 
a cause, will not be enforced by the court 
unless it is evidenced by a writing 
subscribed by the party against whom it is 
alleged or made, and filed by the clerk or 
entered upon the minutes of the court. Any 
other rule would require the court to pass 
upon the credibility of the attorneys. 
73 Am. Jur. 2d Stipulations § 2 (1974) (footnote 
omitted). 
Utah R. Prac. D. & C. Ct. 4.5(b) requires that M[n]o orders, 
judgments or decrees upon stipulation shall be signed or entered 
unless such stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk, 
provided that the stipulation may be made orally in open court." 
There can be little doubt the rule of practice is concerned with 
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds as expressed in Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1984)1 which states that certain agreements 
1. § 25-5-4: Certain agreements void unless written and 
subscribed. In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, 
is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year from the making thereof. 
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are void unless in writing and subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith. The Statute of Frauds was not interposed as 
an affirmative defense below.2 
Basic to a valid stipulation is a meeting of the minds of 
those involved. The parties must have completed their 
negotiations either in person or through their attorneys acting 
within the rules of agency. The agreement then is reduced to 
writing, signed and filed with the clerk or read into the record 
before the court. This procedure would indicate obvious assent 
to the provisions of the agreement so stipulated. Not so here. 
This agreement was reached between one of the parties and 
both counsel. Mrs. Brown remained silent while it was discussed 
and read into the record. The proceeding was not done in court 
as would be permitted by Rule 4.5(b) but was done at the time of 
a deposition before a shorthand reporter. Had it been done in 
court a judge would have been involved and would have made 
inquiry of the parties, likely while they were both under oath, 
if they understood and agreed with the terms. Had Mrs. Brown 
remained silent in that scenario it is hard to imagine the court 
finding agreement. The same* conclusion is compelled here. 
Silence cannot be construed to be assent in these circumstances. 
For a stipulation to be binding, agreement by the parties must be 
evidenced by a signed writing which would satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds, or the agreement must be stated in court on the record 
before a judge. The facts in this case do not show such 
evidence. Therefore, there was no stipulation reached between 
the parties and there is nothing for the court to enforce. 
Defendant argues that plaintiff made no timely objection to 
the agreement and accepted the additional $200.00 per month from 
him; thus she should be estopped from denying its validity. It 
is easily understood why plaintiff accepted the increased 
payments. She was confused as to her position, unsure of what 
her counsel might do next, and the payments appear to have been 
her sole means of support. Any refusal to accept might have 
resulted in a delay or cessation of support or increased delays 
in determining the status of defendant's obligations. We have 
already discussed the time delays plaintiff experienced in 
obtaining an appointment with her counsel after she first read 
the written agreement. These facts are insufficient to impute a 
timeliness issue in accordance with Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 
476 (Utah 1975). Neither do these facts give rise to estoppel. 
2. Certainly a stipulation setting terms for payment of alimonj 
and child support would fall within the Statute of Frauds since 
such an agreement would not be performed within one year from 
the making. The putative stipulation here would run for many 
years with changes to occur at stated intervals. 
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We will not go around the Statute of Frauds and Rule 4.5(b) to 
create a stipulation on the mere acceptance of $200.00 per month 
by plaintiff.3 Whether she is entitled to retain the extra 
payments or will be required to credit defendant shall be 
determined by the trial court on remand. 
In summary, we hold that the putative stipulation of June 5, 
1984, fails to meet the requirements of a valid stipulation as 
stated above. The order enforcing the agreement is reversed and 
the case is remanded to the trial court for further action on 
plaintiff's original petition for modification. Costs against 
defendant. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
ORME, Judge: (dissenting) 
I think what is said in the main opinion about the 
requirements for a binding stipulation is correct. I agree the 
requirements for a valid stipulation were not met in this case. 
However, there are situations where a settlement agreement is 
reached—where all parties have had a meeting of the minds as to 
the basis for settlement of an action or proceeding—through a 
device other than a stipulation. That agreement might be 
memorialized by an exchange of letters, dictation to a shorthand 
reporter, or even just a handshake. In my view, such agreements, 
intended to be binding when made, are enforceable and should be 
enforced. They should be enforced even though one party might 
have a change of heart or otherwise balk at signing a formal 
stipulation designed to implement the valid and binding agreement 
previously made. Parties have no right to welch on a settlement 
deal during the sometimes substantial period between when the 
deal is struck and when all necessary signatures can be garnered 
on a stipulation. 
3. The evidence shows this defendant to be earning a 
substantial income. The additional $200.00 per month paid on 
this putative stipulation represents no hardship and no material 
change of circumstances on his part. 
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The key in this case, then, is whether appellant assented to 
the settlement agreement which was dictated to the reporter in 
her presence. She concededly sat mute throughout the 
proceeding. Her duly employed attorney, however, manifested 
assent on her behalf. The pivotal issue is whether he had 
authority to do so. 
The facts are in conflict on this point. Appellant suggests 
she was stupefied by her former attorney*s betrayal and rendered 
unable to speak or, apparently, even to storm out. On the other 
hand, it is reasonable to infer, as those present did, that a 
principal who says nothing when her agent speaks for her is in 
accord with the sentiments expressed by the agent. This 
inference is bolstered by evidence which is usually quite 
reliable—the subsequent course of conduct of the parties. 
Following the apparent agreement, respondent made payment at the 
higher level contemplated by the putative settlement and for 
several months appellant accepted those payments without 
incident. No unfavorable inference would be available from her 
merely cashing the checks, which were mostly for amounts clearly 
due her. But her retention and use of the extra amount not due 
her under the original decree is consistent only with an 
understanding that a settlement had been reached—or, I suppose, 
of dishonesty on her part* Laypersons fully understand that they 
may spend money only if it is theirs. There being nothing to 
suggest appellant was dishonest, the fact that she kept the extra 
amount rather than returning it tends to show she thought it was 
hers to keep; it could be hers to keep only if the decree were 
modified, as per the settlement, to increase the monthly total 
due for her support and that of the children. Thus, her 
retention and use of the larger payments tendered subsequent to 
the alleged settlement tends to show she had agreed to the terms 
of the settlement. 
The facts concerning whether appellant assented to the 
settlement would support a conclusion either way. After hearing 
the motion to enforce the settlement, which a commissioner 
earlier heard and recommended be granted, the trial court made 
findings of fact to the effect that appellant was bound by the 
settlement. I concede, however, that those findings are not 
entitled to the usual deference because the court did not receive 
actual testimony. £f. Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American 
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Savings & Loan. 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).1 The 
court received affidavits and counsels' representations about 
what the testimony would show. Thus, the trial courtfs usual 
advantage in terms of viewing the witnesses and their demeanor 
does not obtain in this case. We are in as good a position to 
review the affidavits and consider the proffer2 as was the 
1. In Diversified Equities, the trial court received an 
extensive recitation of facts to which the parties had 
stipulated. 739 P.2d at 1134. The trial court then entered 
••findings" of fact. We observed: "Generally, a trial court's 
findings of fact are accorded great deference. However, without 
regard to the labels used, when those "findings" proceed from 
stipulated facts . . . the "findings" are tantamount to 
conclusions of law, with the stipulation of facts being the 
functional equivalent of the findings of fact." 739 P.2d at 
1136. That conclusion is premised on two factors: First, a 
disposition based on stipulated facts is "not one involving 
resolution by the trial court of conflicting testimony." 
Schroederv. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. 1979) (en banc). 
Second, since the facts are written or recited and do not turn 
on witness credibility, an appellate court has "the same means 
as the trial court had of reaching a correct conclusion of 
law . . . ." Stiles v. Brown, 380 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Ala. 
1980). Those same factors apply to the affidavits and proffer 
which substituted for testimony in the instant case. Although 
the conflict between the affidavits should have prompted an 
evidentiary hearing, see Note 3, infra, we are in as good a 
position as was the trial court to read the affidavits and the 
proffer and draw logical conclusions therefrom. 
2. Fortunately, one of the two attorneys requested that the 
hearing be reported or the proffer would be unavailable to us. 
Such a hearing should be reported as a matter of course. See 
Brioos v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
("Although consistently making a record of all proceedings 
imposes a greater burden on the trial court and court reporters, 
it is impossible for an appellate court to review what may 
ultimately prove to be important proceedings when no record of 
them has been made."). 
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trial court.3 After considering these items, I agree with rne 
commissioner and the trial judge that the facts more readily 
support the conclusion that appellant initially agreed to the 
settlement and then had a change of heart than the conclusion 
that she never agreed but was rendered unable to say so and 
simply regarded the extra amounts tendered as a coincidental gift 
from her ex-husband. 
I would affirm. 
Gregory K. Orme# Judge 
3. In retrospect, an evidentiary hearing would probably have 
been preferable. Had the testimony been consistent with the 
affidavits and proffer and the same findings made, those findings 
would clearly be entitled to the usual deference and the trial 
court's disposition would clearly be entitled to affirmance. 
However, neither side requested an evidentiary hearing and 
appellant does not argue on appeal that she was entitled to one. 
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Donald Marchant 
were both college 
of study before 
Plaintiff Karen Marchant and defendant 
were married on September 8, 1967, when they 
students. Plaintiff completed one more year 
taking a job while defendant continued his education, received 
a degree in civil engineering, and completed two semesters of 
postgraduate studies. Defendant has been employed by the U. S. 
Forest Service for the majority of his working life while 
plaintiff did not return to the work force on a full time basis 
until late in the marriage. 
The Marchants found they were unable to have children and 
consequently adopted two infants: a boy in April 1974 and a 
girl in April 1977. During 1976, the couple purchased a home 
and a farm in Central, Sevier County, Utah and resided there 
until their separation. 
During 1982, plaintiff began working for a medical 
organization which maintained an office in Richfield, Utah. 
Defendant appears to have resented both his wife's employment 
and the working relationship between plaintiff and her male 
supervisor. The previous strains on the marriage grew 
correspondingly and the relationship deteriorated. There were 
attempts at counseling but these proved unsuccessful. During 
an argument concerning the state of the marriage, defendant 
struck plaintiff, causing her to lose consciousness. The final 
separation followed immediately. 
needs, and defendant's ability to provide support. We do not 
intend to imply that plaintiff should or should not receive 
alimony. That determination is to be made by the trier of fact 
and must be supported by adequate findings of fact. 
BIAS 
In both the docketing statement filed on appeal and in her 
appellate briefs, plaintiff alleges bias on the part of the 
trial court because she exercised her right to seek a divorce. 
The written findings of fact and the judge's oral findings and 
rulings at the conclusion of the trial contain statements which 
raise this issue. At pages 130-31 of the trial transcript, the 
judge stated: 
I'll be honest. I have difficulty with 
what the Plaintiff sues, alleges grounds. 
I have difficulty finding where this 
Defendant's done anything wrong, other 
than slapping her. Maybe that was 
justified. I don't believe in it. I 
don't believe anyone should use force and 
violence. But I'm having difficulty. 
However, under the circumstances I don't 
see where I can force them to live 
together. So based on that I'm going to 
find that the Defendant did treat the 
Plaintiff cruelly, causing her physical 
and mental anguish, physical anguish 
because he struck her on the one occasion 
when he was what appeared to me highly 
provoked. 
This Court cannot accept any rationale for the trial court's 
comment concerning defendant's lack of fault "other than 
slapping her* which occurred when he was "what appeared to me 
highly provoked." We have previously offered our opinion 
concerning this all too common expression of an inability to 
deal with a differing point of view. We see little reason why 
the trial court's findings of fact refer to plaintiff's moving 
into an apartment with "another woman who is divorced" or the 
nonspecific comment as to plaintiff's lifestyle. However, we 
stress that the issue of bias was not brought up in the court 
below pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b). This issue arises, in 
our minds, through the judge's comments and rulings at trial. 
We offer the general philosophy expressed in Haslam v. 
Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (1948), noting that an 
affidavit of bias and prejudice is treated differently today 
than it was in 1948. Justice Wolfe, writing for the Court, 
stated: 
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The purity and integrity of the judicial 
process ought to be protected against any 
taint of suspicion to the end that the 
public and litigants may have the highest 
confidence in the integrity and fairness 
of the courts. 
Justice Wade in a concurring opinion stressed this point 
when he wrote: 
One of the most important things in 
government is that all persons subject to 
its jurisdiction shall always be able to 
obtain a fair and impartial trial in all 
matters of litigation in its courts. It 
is nearly as important that the people 
have absolute confidence in the integrity 
of the courts. I can think of nothing 
that would as surely bring the courts into 
disrepute as for a judge to insist on 
trying a case where one of the litigants 
believes that such judge is biased and 
prejudiced against him. 
Id. at 526. 
We reverse and remand for a new trial on all issues 
excluding the granting of the divorce/ which is affirmed, 
Costs against defendant. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
R. W. Garff/ Judge 
860250-CA 13 
APPENDIX E 
STROUD v. STROUD 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 ATr_ 
UTAH STATE 
00O00 LAW LIBRARY 
Karen W. Stroud (Miller), 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
James M. Stroud, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Bench, Garff and Greenwood. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860049-CA 
F I L E D 
JUN171987 
Timothy 11 Shea 
BENCH, Judge: c,erk ol lhe Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Defendant appeals an order of the Third District Court 
refusing to stay the accrual of interest on a judgment for 
delinquent child support payments. We affirm. 
Plaintiff Karen W. Stroud and defendant James M. Stroud 
were divorced on June 20, 1972. The decree granted plaintiff 
care, custody, and control of the couple's two minor children. 
The decree also ordered defendant to pay child support of 
$75.00 per child per month. On September 20, 1983/ the trial 
court issued an order to show cause why judgment should not be 
entered against defendant for past due child support. At a 
hearing on March 6, 1984, the trial court found in favor of 
plaintiff and ordered defendant to pay her $18,815.00 in 
principal and interest plus attorney fees and court costs, with 
interest on the unpaid balance to accrue at 12% per annum until 
paid. The court issued its findings, conclusions, and order on 
March 15, 1984. 
Defendant filed a motion to amend the judgment on June 8, 
1984. Defendant asked the court to stay execution of the 
judgment provided defendant make payments of $300.00 per 
month.1 Defendant also requested the court to prohibit the 
accrual of interest on the unpaid judgment provided he remain 
1. Initially, defendant would pay $150.00 per month child 
support and $150.00 per month on the judgment. In February, 
1985, the older child would reach majority and the child 
support payment would decrease to $75.00 while the judgment 
payment would increase to $225.00. 
current on his payments. In an order issued July 19, 1984, the 
court granted defendant's motion to stay execution of the 
judgment provided payments were made. However, the court 
concluded, under Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1986), it could not 
waive the interest on a judgment. Defendant filed a notice of 
appeal on July 31, 1984. 
On appeal, defendant contends Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) 
(1979) grants a trial court the authority to suspend interest 
payments when such action is determined to be equitable. 
Therefore, argues defendant, the trial court erred in ruling it 
had no power to stay the accrual of interest. 
Section 15-1-4 provides that, unless otherwise specified 
by contract, H. . . judgments shall bear interest at the rate 
of 12% per annum." (Emphasis added.) Defendant suggests where 
equity requires, this statute may be ignored under section 
30-3-5(1) (1979) which states, "When a decree of divorce is 
rendered, the court may make such orders in relation to the 
children, property and parties, and the maintenance of the 
parties and children, as may be equitable "2 Defendant 
cites Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2d 436, 491 P.2d 231 (1971), 
and Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Utah 1978), in support of his 
argument. 
In Harmon, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial court's 
stay of execution on a judgment for support arrearages using 
the following rationale: 
In order to carry out the important 
responsibility of safeguarding the interests 
and welfare of children, it has always been 
deemed that the courts have broad equitable 
powers. To accept the plaintiff's contention 
that an adjudged arrearage is tantamount to a 
judgment in law, would in the long run tend 
to impair rather than to enhance the 
abilities of both the plaintiff and the court 
to accomplish the desired objective. Such a 
judgment at law does not have the valuable 
and useful attribute which allows its 
enforcement by contempt measures. For the 
foregoing reasons decrees and orders in 
divorce proceedings are of a different and 
higher character than judgments in suits of 
law; and by their nature are better suited to 
the purpose of protecting the interests and 
welfare of children. . . . [W]here it 
2. In 1985, this section was amended to read, •'When a decree 
of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable 
orders relating to the children, property, and parties. . . ." 
The amendments have no effect on the issue raised in the 
present case. 
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appears to be in the furtherance of the 
courtfs responsibility of safeguarding the 
welfare of children, the District Court may 
upon conditions which he deems appropriate 
and consistent with that objective, make an 
order such as the one here under attack, 
staying the issuance of execution. 
Harmon. 491 P.2d at 232, 233. In the instant case, the trial 
court appropriately exercised its discretion and stayed execution 
of the judgment. 
In Pope, the trial court, in dividing the marital property, 
ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $24,984.00. Apparently in 
order to induce defendant to pay the money within six months, the 
court ordered that if the amount remained unpaid after the six 
month period, then interest would increase from the then statutory 
rate of eight percent to ten percent. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court#s order and held, "Sec. 15-1-4, which 
requires. . . judgments to bear interest at the rate of eight 
percent per year, does not preclude a District Court, under Sec. 
30-3-5 from imposing an interest rate of more than eight percent 
where, under the circumstances, that award is reasonable and 
equitable.- 589 P.2d at 754. 
Defendant claims the breadth of discretion exercised by the 
trial court in Harmon and Pope and affirmed by the Supreme Court 
is similar to the discretion the trial court in this case claimed 
it did not have. Defendant argues that, if, under Pope, the trial 
court has the discretion to raise the interest rate on a judgment 
in a divorce decree, the court also has the discretion to stay the 
accrual of interest on the judgment. 
This approach is contrary to law. Section 15-1-4 states 
judgments HshallH bear the statutory rate of interest. According 
to the Utah Supreme Court, the meaning of the word shall is 
usually or ordinarily presumed to be mandatory. Herr v. Salt Lake 
County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 1974); State v. Zeimer, 10 Utah 2d 45, 
347 P.2d 1111 (1960). Section 15-1-4 is a very specific statute 
while section 30-3-5(1) is much more general. "When two statutory 
provisions appear to conflict, the more specific provision will 
govern over the more general provision." Perry v. Pioneer 
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984). 
Furthermore, when principles of equity confront rules of law, 
-equity follows the law.- McDermott v. McDermott, 628 P.2d 959, 
960 (Ariz. App. 1981). The Court of Appeals of Arizona states, 
- . . . courts of equity are as much bound by plain and positive 
provisions of statute as are courts of law and where rights are 
clearly established and defined by statute, equity has no power to 
change or upset such rights.- Stokes v. Stokes, 694 P.2d 1204, 
1208 (Ariz. App. 1984). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held one who obtains a judgment for 
unpaid maintenance and support is entitled to interest thereon 
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until paid. In Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267, 430 P.2d 580 
(1967), the trial court awarded a judgment for unpaid alimony 
under a Nevada divorce decree. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgment, and, in response to defendant's request to modify the 
accrued installments, held, "The right to such accrued installment 
payments vested in the plaintiff upon the due date of each 
installment, and the plaintiff is entitled to interest thereon at 
the legal rate until payment is made/ !£. at 583. (Emphasis 
added.) See also McKav v. McKav* 13 Utah 2d 187, 370 P.2d 358 
(1962); Larsen v. Larsen, 9 Utah 2d 160, 340 P.2d 421 (1959); Cole 
v. Cole. 101 Utah 355, 122 P.2d 201 (1942). 
The general rule that a spouse is entitled to interest on a 
judgment for support arrearages until paid is followed in several 
other jurisdictions. Jarvis v. Jarvis. 27 Ariz. App. 266, 553 
P.2d 1251 (1976); In re Marriage of Popenhaaer, 99 Cal. App. 3d 
514, 160 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1979); m re Marriage Qt Schvtte, 721 
P.2d 160 (Colo. App. 1986); Strand v. Despain, 79 Ida. 304, 316 
P.2d 262 (1957); Chaudoir v. Chaudoir, 430 So.2d 280 (La. App. 
1983); Rubisoff v. Rubisoff. 242 Miss. 225, 133 So.2d 534 (1961); 
Gardner v. Gardner, 253 S.C. 325, 170 S.E.2d 372 (1969). The 
Colorado Court of Appeals specifically held, under a statute 
similar to section 15-1-4, H. . . the trial court is without 
discretion to deny interest.H Schutte, 721 P.2d at 162. See also 
Popenhaaer, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 384. 
We hold a judgment for child support arrearages is a judgment 
under section 15-1-4.3 The custodial spouse is entitled to the 
statutory rate of interest on the judgment until payment in full. 
Although the trial court may, in its discretion under section 
30-3-5, raise the statutory interest if equity so requires, the 
court does not have the discretion to lower, stay, or waive 
interest. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
3. Our decision falls squarely within the spirit and intent of 
newly enacted Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(1)(a)(1987): -Each paymei 
or installment of child or spousal support under any child suppori 
order . . . is, on and after the date it is due: (a) a judgment 
with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district 
court . . . .H 
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GREENWOOD, J. (Dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The Utah 
Supreme Court1s holding in Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Utah 
1978), I believe, mandates a decision that in divorce 
proceedings a trial court judge may, as a matter of law, bar 
the accrual of interest or decrease the rate of interest from 
that statutorily established on a judgment if the equities in a 
divorce proceeding justify such action. 
As pointed out in the majority opinion, Pope upheld the 
power of the judge to require payment of interest at a rate 
higher than that statutorily imposed, if the judgment debtor 
failed to pay the judgment for child support arrearages within 
a specified time. Similarly in this case, appellant wished to 
argue for an abatement of interest accrual if he made payments 
on the judgment as agreed. Both involved only prospective 
interest accrual, and would provide an incentive to the debtor 
to make payments as ordered by the court. 
The majority contends that the statutory interest is 
mandatory, first, because the word "shall" in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 15-1-4 (1986) eliminates the possibility of any discretion, 
and second, because the general provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5(1) must be governed by the more specific provisions of 
§ 15-1-4. However, Pope deviates from the statutory rate 
despite the conflict between the two statutes and the 
compulsory "must" in § 15-1-4. In fact, Pope, in effect, 
establishes that § 30-3-5(1) controls § 15-1-4, contrary to the 
majority opinion. As stated in Pope, "Sec. 15-1-4, which 
requires . . . judgments to bear interest at the rate of eight 
percent per year, does not preclude a District Court, under 
Sec. 30-3-5 from imposing an interest rate of more than eight 
percent where, under the circumstances, that award is 
reasonable and equitable." lei. at 754. 
Furthermore, consistent with Pope, the trial judge in 
domestic matters should have considerable latitude in 
exercising the court's discretion and equitable powers to 
fashion remedies which best serve not only the parties, but, 
more importantly, the children of the parties. It is certainly 
conceivable that the court could reason that a delinquent 
support obligor would be more likely to pay such a judgment 
with an abatement or suppression of interest that would allow 
for an eventual satisfaction of the judgment. As a matter of 
policy, this may be preferable to no payments at all. The 
trial judge is in the best position to determine the method 
most likely to actually produce support payments. 
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To try to distinguish Pope and allow higher, but not lower 
than the statutory interest rate violates principals of 
fairness and evenhandedness. It would be more consistent to 
overrule Pope. However, given the precedent of Pope. I believe 
this Court should reverse and hold that in divorce cases the 
court may prospectively reduce or suspend interest accrual on 
judgments for delinquent child support, as a legitimate 
exercise of the equitable powers of the court. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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